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3E X EC U T I V E  SU M M A RY
This paper aims to observe the role of the Turkish state 
in conflict resolution (CR). The validity of conflict 
resolution depends on implementing immediate or 
time-sensitive measures toward a temporary or lasting 
solution. The state’s conflict resolution roles emanate 
from the state’s capabilities, usage of power, and stra-
tegic environment. This paper addresses the following 
questions to make sense of the role of state in conflict 
resolution in Turkey: What is the role of state in conflict 
resolution? What defines this role? In what ways do the 
state’s conflict resolution roles differ in domestic and 
foreign policy? What are the repercussions of these 
roles? It concludes that the need for change in the 
state’s CR role is essential and in many ways paramount 
to the provision of basic public goods such as security 
and stability. The current approach harms Turkish 
interests and deprives Turkey of its ability to solve 
deep-rooted socio-political problems. It would be wise 
for policy makers to work toward the consolidation of 
democracy and rule of law in order to set the stage for 
a more constructive and results-oriented, state-led CR 
effort in Turkey.
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I N T R O D UCT I O N
In general, states are considered consequential actors 
in conflict resolution (CR). The binary analysis of 
success/failure in analyzing CR fails to explain the 
dynamics behind the state’s CR roles. The motivations, 
persisting attitudes, flexibility and adaptability, and 
learning process, among others, should be taken into 
account in order to grasp the dynamics of the state’s 
wider CR role and its conflict transformation capa-
bility. In the Turkish case, the fact that the Turkish state 
is a “strong state” relative to all domestic actors would 
imply that the state is easily able to settle conflicts. 
Yet in practice, this assumption is not verified when it 
comes to addressing major political, social, ideational 
and ethnic conflicts. This is largely due to the state 
elite’s failure to grasp the dynamics and complexity 
of CR, which has resulted in the state imposing either 
co-optation or coercion as exclusive formulas in 
the domestic arena. More nuanced approaches in 
foreign policy fail to be implemented due to domestic 
constraints.
Against this backdrop, this report aims to observe the 
Turkish state’s role in CR. It attempts to address the 
following questions: What is the role of the state in CR? 
What defines this role? In what ways do the state’s CR 
roles differ in domestic and foreign policy? What are 
the repercussions of these roles? This brief underlines 
the need for change in the state’s CR role in order to 
provide vital public goods such as security and stability. 
It offers constructive steps toward formulating a 
political and cultural shift in approaching Turkish CR.
5P O L I T I C S,  P OW E R  A N D  STAT E  I N  T U R K E Y
The Turkish state tradition was largely shaped by 
early modernization attempts that aimed at building 
a capable state authority. In a continuum, the process 
of state-building (or nation-building) not only defined 
the political direction of the country but also shaped 
the very dynamics of the state system, which eventu-
ally gave rise to a modern nation-state. Overall, the 
patrimonial belief that “the well-being of the society 
depended upon the well-being of the state”1 was largely 
held as a founding premise in Turkish political thought.
This state-centric outlook, having sought to empower 
the state vis-à-vis domestic and external actors, has 
given the state elites major if not exclusive roles as 
agents of change in Turkey. Historically, the leader of 
the state has had exclusive rights over the realm to the 
degree of assuming divine authority,2 which reflexively 
also elevated the future role of executive leaders 
beyond the limits of constitutional and electoral poli-
tics. Following modernization, the bureaucracy aptly 
gained an upper hand in duplicating Western reforms 
and turned into agents of further centralization of state 
authority.3 The rise of what has been called the modern 
administrative state4 paved the way for centralization 
and, more precisely, competitive hold of state authority 
between the political leadership and civil bureaucracy, 
the latter assuming an expanding, self-assigned role as 
the guardian of the state.
Owing to the innate populist characteristics of the 
Republican regime and the ensuing democratizing 
reforms, popular legitimacy has been a defining 
element of the system. Therefore, the inherent center-
periphery dichotomy5 in Turkish politics between the 
ruling strata and the populace necessitated the integra-
tion of public grievances in the political system. Poli-
cymaking remained a privileged mandate for the state 
elites, who sustained their hold on state authority in the 
name of “the state’s (supreme) interests.” In any case, 
civil society or pluralistic pressure groups were either 
1 Metin Heper, “Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics,” Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 66.
2 Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk ve Adalet (Kronik Kitap: İstanbul, 
2016).
3 Metin Heper, “19. yy’da Osmanlı Bürokrasisi,” in Tanzimat’tan Cumhuri-
yet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1985), 245–258.
4 Musa Çadırcı, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Ülke Yönetimi,” in Tan-
zimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 230.
5 Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” 
Daedalus 102, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 169–190.
too vulnerable under the state’s command or opted to 
embed themselves in the state apparatus whenever 
they felt powerful enough to influence policy.
The Turkish state has been largely successful in inte-
grating majority groups into its fold, never turning itself 
into a post-colonial type minority regime. The early 
Republican years saw a relatively smooth transition 
from the millet system to the collective identification 
of the Muslim majority in Turkey as (Muslim) Turks, 
including major immigrant groups from the Balkans 
and Caucasia. The founding fathers of the Republic 
were largely former Young Turks; their immigrant 
roots were juxtaposed by their elite status thanks 
to their educational backgrounds in the Ottoman 
academies. They embarked on a civilizing mission to 
modernize the Anatolian people with transformative 
steps towards Westernization and Turkification. Later 
on, the Republic, in different phases, came to integrate 
the Anatolian peasantry and Muslim petit bourgeoisie 
either through urbanization or education. In the end, 
regardless of their ethnic or rural background, the 
cultural center defined by the state elites picked up 
capable and willing peripheral elements, who later on 
became the stalwarts of the Republican regime either 
in politics, military, or bureaucracy. Yet, this openness 
to personal vertical mobility did not amount to integra-
tion of peripheral culture into the center. In political 
terms, a formidable exception has been Islamists and 
minority groups such as the Kurds, non-Muslims, and 
heterodox Muslim subgroups, which have been major 
nuisances for defining an all-encompassing secular 
Turkish identity.
Overall, the tone of political competition was set by 
the contest for power among state elites. Against the 
backdrop of shifting alliances of state elites, elected 
governments faced the formidable authority of the 
civil and military bureaucracy. The relative weight 
of these two major actors defined the autocratic or 
pluralistic character of the political regime. Unless a 
strong party/government/leader with ample political 
legitimacy pushed the political system to its limits, the 
bureaucratic apparatus shied away from forfeiting its 
guardian role. With a claim to ideological ownership 
of the regime, the bureaucracy would also opt to settle 
for a seemingly behind-the-scenes role in a balance of 
power setting. Yet, the quest for political hegemony 
would open up the possibility of autocratic adminis-
tration, which would again occur either in the form 
of strong political leadership or uncontested bureau-
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cratic regimes. In the modern Turkish experience, the 
bureaucracy would seek to set the constitutional limits 
of the system following major political adjustments, 
i.e., military coups almost every decade, in which the 
military put binding checks in place and withdrew to 
its supervisory role afterwards.
The tension between the state elite’s centralizing 
reforms and the periphery’s quest for autonomy also 
determined the cooperative or coercive tone of the 
relationship between state and society. The Republican 
ideals of modernizing the nation in a top-down 
fashion, which at the end of the day isolated Islam 
as a “backward” belief of the periphery, aggravated 
the dichotomy between what Mardin called “the 
bureaucratic center” and “the democratic periphery.”6 
Thereafter, Turkish political parties entered into an 
unending power struggle. With the bureaucracy’s 
unwavering hold on Republican values, above all laicite 
and nationalism, the periphery’s “democratic” (or 
rather, popular) strive for legitimizing its worldview 
through electoral politics largely hit a wall. A series of 
military coups under the straitjacket of the Cold War 
sustained this bureaucratic hegemony in defining the 
state ideology, hence the rules of the game.
Only in a post-Cold War setting could the periphery 
take incremental steps to turn around this equation. 
Beginning with the liberalist reforms of former 
President Turgut Özal, conservative-nationalist 
parties vying for peripheral support paved the way 
for integrating symbols of Islam, more precisely 
Islamism, into mainstream Turkish politics. On that 
note, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), 
along the lines of the Democrat Party (DP) of the 
1950s and Justice Party (AP) of the 1960s, made yet 
another attempt to democratize the bureaucratic 
center. The party found international backing thanks 
to a series of favorable developments, above all the EU 
accession process as well as the post-9/11 international 
conjuncture. However, against an entrenched political 
regime, the political struggle did not end up winning 
consequential electoral support but carried on against 
military ultimatums, threats of party closure, and 
alleged coup plans. 
Yet, the AK Party’s response to this undemocratic 
resistance has not been exclusively “democratic” as 
its proponents claim. On the contrary, it committed 
a cardinal sin to co-opt the unruly elements in the 
security and judicial apparatus on a common platform 
to rollback what they called “bureaucratic tutelage.” 
6 Ibid., 186.
This diversion to extralegal and in general illegitimate 
methods undid the AK Party’s founding ethos to 
represent a universal appeal for democratizing the 
regime. The shaky and unsustainable coalitions 
working toward mostly short-term goals derailed the 
party’s unique chance to liberalize the system. In the 
end, rather than solidifying a consensual democratic 
center, the AK Party came to redefine and own the 
bureaucratic center on its own terms, especially 
following the July 15 coup attempt in 2016.7 With the 
rise of multivectoral security threats, the AK Party 
government came to co-opt the security state and 
chose to coerce centrifugal and oppositional elements, 
mainly the secularists and the Kurds, into submission. 
The major question for Turkey’s future conflict map is 
whether the newly defined center would inadvertently 
solidify a democratic or rejectionist periphery. The 
answer to this question would also be telling about the 
direction of democratic politics in Turkey. In case of 
a sustained legitimacy problem, the loss of a delicate 
balance in center-periphery dichotomy could turn 
Turkey into what Holsti called a “weak state”8 and 
push the door wide open for internal conflict. Again, 
one could reemphasize Holsti’s advice to “strengthen 
(of ) the states”9 to reestablish both the eroding state 
capacity and political legitimacy in Turkey.
7 Bülent Aras, State, Institutions and Reform in Turkey after July 15, 
Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, March 2017.
8 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge, New 
York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).
9 Ibid.
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Against this background of political competition 
in Turkey, the state has assumed definitive conflict 
resolution (CR) roles in domestic and foreign policy. 
The variance in tone and methodology stemmed 
naturally from the differences in jurisdiction and 
sovereignty rights at home and in the foreign policy 
realm. Examining the choices of policy makers and 
their varying roles provides additional information 
about the principles and mechanisms of the Turkish 
state’s CR efforts. Although the state’s CR role is 
dynamic in nature, state choices rely on deep-seated 
preferences and necessities and are contingent upon 
developments in domestic, regional, and international 
fronts. Turkey’s state tradition and national security 
agenda also prevail in the determination of the state’s 
CR roles. 
The state’s traditionally predominant role in the 
domestic sphere is thought to assign it an all-out role 
in conflict resolution. However, the major determinant 
of CR efforts is not the conventional role assumed by 
the state, but the autocratic or pluralistic character 
of the regime, which is, as explained above, largely a 
function of the government-bureaucracy relationship. 
The better the accord between the two, the better 
the chances of the state’s capacity to transform the 
conflict situation, which would seal the efficiency of 
CR efforts. The idea behind transforming the situation 
is to achieve a lasting and participatory solution to the 
conflict. In case of what was earlier called autocratic 
administration, i.e., strong political leadership or an 
uncontested bureaucratic regime, the state is less likely 
to be open for dialogue, compromise, or integration of 
public grievances. Therefore, absent the magic formula 
to create a pluralistic government-bureaucracy-
society relationship, the Turkish state’s CR role is 
predominantly defined under the binary choices of 
co-optation and coercion.
Overall, the Turkish state’s defining approach to 
internal conflicts is to defy and delegitimize peripheral 
activity. There is a thin line between co-optation and 
coercion as defining alternatives, since both utilize 
either threats or means of violence as leverage. Given 
that political competition is deemed a zero-sum 
game, the deep-rooted state tradition is intolerant 
of opposition of any kind. This equation allows no 
exceptions in times of crisis, and even decent attempts 
to contribute to CR roles by third parties carry the risk 
of being construed as undermining state authority. As 
one media representative underlined: “Although civil 
society attempts to open a maneuvering space in the 
political arena, it would only be possible by the will and 
consent of the state, which is the determinant actor [in 
Turkey].”10 In this sense, civil society and citizens are 
taught to help themselves out of conflict situations 
within the straitjacket of existing state institutions and 
boundaries set by the state apparatus.
The state’s non-conciliatory CR roles of co-optation 
and coercion are mainly due to a perpetuated refusal 
to establish and manage a working relationship 
with society under an inclusive social order. In 
theory, co-optation creates opportunity for the 
accommodation of differences and ideally embeds 
peripheral demands in relevant institutions. 
Repression is the state’s capacity for coercion. Although 
the Turkish state has exhibited an integrative capacity 
in a number of cases, i.e., the Kurdish peace process 
and the Alevi (Alawite) opening, these attempts 
did not go beyond tactical steps and played into 
political exigency rather than symbolizing strategic 
orientation towards reconciliation. Early hopes at the 
outset of these CR efforts have turned into further 
disappointment without substantial improvement to 
change the conflict situation. Regardless of the initial 
choice of co-optation or coercion, the state reserves the 
penal right to criminalize its domestic interlocutors 
and write them off as non-players in CR processes at 
any point. On the other hand, the state’s incoherent 
and haphazard application of coercion, together 
with insufficient capacity for addressing peripheral 
demands, has resulted in protracted and, in most cases, 
frozen conflicts in Turkey. Turkish administrations in 
general and the AK Party governments in particular 
have demonstrated that they may not prioritize conflict 
resolution in their political agenda unless the conflicts 
escalate into a potential threat to survival. 
There has been a cycle of securitization and 
de-securitization in terms of the state’s approach 
to so-called internal enemies. The enemy-threat 
chain and repudiating peripheral demands is the 
state’s preference—it could almost be considered its 
default mode. The state’s failure to build up  societal 
consent  for policies through participation and good 
governance results in the reproduction of partition 
(bölünme) paranoia and imposing a perpetual mood of 
10 Interview with a media representative by Pınar Akpınar in correspon-
dence with the author, Istanbul, October 17, 2017.
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a state of emergency in daily life.11 Exceptional periods 
of relative de-securitization result in de-escalation of 
the conflicts and provide the state relief in its domestic 
and international CR roles. Such eras of lowered threat 
perceptions have largely been periods of Turkish 
realignments in foreign policy to accommodate 
pressing needs for harmony with the ascending 
international order. Absent foreign pressures for 
change or during international periods of upheaval, the 
dominant mode of a national security state duly sets 
in. There is no nuanced understanding of conflicts in a 
healthy and pluralistic center-periphery relationship. 
This also empowers the unitarian understanding of 
politics and leads to labeling the opposition as a threat 
to national security. It is a matter of time before the 
forces of opposition face reprisals without an objective 
understanding of either their crime or as to why some 
entities are exposed to state measures while others are 
spared.
For the Turkish state, it does not matter whether the 
conflict is societal, ethnic, or of any other nature. 
There are no signs of a learning process taking root, 
considering the fact that the national security state 
apparatus has sustained a non-conciliatory approach 
without much success in defusing crises.  An orthodox 
loyalty to the state’s traditional CR roles can be seen 
in the state’s attitude toward the Kurdish problem, 
namely the resuscitation of 1990s policies following 
a short-lived “peace process.” A similar detour from 
peace to national security measures was witnessed 
under Özal after he granted some recognition to the 
Kurds and proposed the prospect of peace. However, 
after his death the talks on ceasefire and solution were 
replaced with harsh security measures.12 
The assumption in the literature on CR is that for states 
“in a prolonged conflict, learning takes place as changes 
in beliefs, in behavior, and in policy [occur], due to the 
extent of time and the variety of events included in 
this type of conflict.”13 The recurrence of resistance to 
change and revival of the security state is both structural 
and cultural. First, it is due mainly to the state’s lack of 
capacity to control various conflict situations backed 
by institutionalized measures. Fikri Sağlar, Member 
of Parliament from the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) pointed out the overlapping attitudes of the 
11 Interview with Sırrı Süreyya Önder by Pınar Akpınar, Member of Par-
liament, in correspondence with the author, People’s Democratic Party, 
Ankara, November 21, 2017.
12 Mesut Yeğen, The Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey: Genesis, Evolution and 
Prospects, Global Turkey in Europe Working Paper 11, IAI (May 2015), 3.
13 Rachel Suissa, “Conflict as a Learning Process: States Conflict Versus 
State and Non-State Actor Conflict,” Defence Studies 11, no.2 (2011): 325.
ruling AK Party with the post-1980 coup authoritarian 
understanding of CR. He explains how this led to the 
exclusion of the Kurds and other peripheral groups and 
the rise of authoritarian tendencies in politics.14  The 
resultant binary approach of co-optation and coercion 
is far from securing the population’s cooperation 
through enforcing rule of law and building legitimate, 
reliable institutions.15 Second, the state does not have a 
culture of appropriating a strategy of inclusiveness and 
openness and does not provide any room for integrating 
peripheral grievances into the political system. This 
attitude blocks negotiation channels, even if there 
would emerge an opportunity to co-opt certain groups. 
Talip Küçükcan, Member of Parliament from the ruling 
AK Party, challenges this view stating, “Today, there is 
more opportunity for expressing one’s identity (in the 
public sphere) in comparison to the past.”16 However, 
even if it is so, the state’s domestic CR roles are far from 
addressing the dynamic nature of the societal, identity, 
and ethnic conflicts in Turkey. 
Societal and non-state actors “strategically navigate 
the institutional, spatial, and knowledge politics that 
produce and transform”17 conflict situations, which go 
beyond the predetermined worldview of the state’s CR 
roles. Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Member of Parliament from 
the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 
responded to a question about what the state apparatus 
can do for the solution of Kurdish problem: “What we 
want from the state is for it to stay away from feeding 
the conflict for a little while.”18 As a result, the state’s 
strategies fail to produce counter narratives against 
societal actors, who define the conflict situation and 
perpetuate their claim outside the purview of the 
political system. The history of Islamist, leftist, and 
Kurdish movements epitomize this cycle of repudiation 
followed by cycles of co-optation or, more often than 
not, coercion, while only the former Islamists found a 
way of redefining the bureaucratic center as a result of 
their later co-optation in the 2000s.
Thus, state employed CR measures have been far from 
able to provide transitional justice in Turkey, while 
14 Interview with Fikri Sağlar by Pınar Akpınar, Member of Parliament, Re-
publican People’s Party, in correspondence with the author, Ankara, No-
vember 21, 2017.
15 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 
21st Century (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004)
16 Interview with Talip Küçükcan by Pınar Akpınar, Member of Parliament, 
Justice and Development Party, in correspondence with the author, Anka-
ra, November 21, 2017.
17 Sarah Elwood, “Beyond Cooptation or Resistance: Urban Spatial Politics, 
Community Organizations, and GIS-Based Spatial Narratives,” Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 96, no. 2 (2006): 693–708.
18 Interview with Önder.
9certain segments of society perpetuate, either actively 
or passively, polarized and deepening memories of 
conflict. What comes forward instead is the state’s 
commitment to survival at all costs. This existential 
approach again sets the stage for the vicious circle 
of self-fulfilling threats and counter-moves towards 
a wide range of enemies in the country rather than 
beginning processes of reconciliation. The state puts 
forward a power hierarchy through formal means of 
oppression and expects the obedience and submission 
of peripheral groups. This also stems from an approach 
that automatically writes off peripheral demands as 
inferior and confers the state apparatus a blank check to 
bend these demands in its favor. The state’s superiority 
complex leads to a dilemma in which the repeated 
escalation of threats again feeds into perception that 
these threats are matters of life or death. Although such 
enemy-threat chains with exaggerated presentation 
serve to vindicate the national security agenda of the 
state apparatus, what is most essential is the state 
capacity, or rather incapacity, to deal with conflict 
situations in the end. 
In contrast to Turkey’s traditional cautious foreign 
policy and non-involvement in third party conflicts, 
the AK Party era foreign policy has symbolized an era 
of daring strategies and risks, which have made—albeit 
haphazardly—use of CR instruments. The ultimate 
goal of Turkish CR efforts has been to prevent spillover 
from regional and international crises into Turkey, 
contribute to peace and security in the neighborhood 
and beyond, and help alleviate humanitarian disasters 
around the world including faraway territories in 
the underdeveloped parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. Turkey’s immediate threats are transnational 
terrorism and the global refugee flow, which are 
international challenges in nature. For this reason, 
Turkey’s international conflict resolution engagements 
aim to not only contribute to international peace-
making mechanisms but also eliminate direct and 
indirect threats to Turkey.
Diplomacy is supposed to be the major component 
of Turkey’s international CR role. Yet, there are two 
major impediments before the diplomatic track. First 
problematic is the increasing overlap of domestic 
and foreign policy agendas. While the former has 
overshadowed the latter with the ongoing political 
transition, both have contributed to the increasing 
polarization process in Turkey. Second, Turkey’s state 
tradition dictates that domestic security is attached to 
foreign policy. Thus, Turkey’s search for a CR role in 
the region and international arena takes priority over 
establishing a security framework for Turkey. Although 
Turkey’s NATO/Western alliance has traditionally 
been at the center of its international security orienta-
tion, Turkish policy makers have sought alternative 
alignments dependent on the complexity of security 
threats. Turkey’s engagements in the UN, its search 
for an international profile in promoting mediation 
and humanitarianism, and its CR attempts in different 
geographies have also been directly linked with the 
domestic urge for gaining moral high ground. As a 
result of this instrumentalist approach in foreign policy, 
Turkey’s ability to make optimum use of diplomacy in 
CR efforts has been widely handicapped.
The second CR role of the Turkish state in regional and 
international relations is peacebuilding/mediation. 
This role is similar to the role of diplomacy in CR, 
with humanitarian and NGO dimensions as integral 
parts of it. This CR role includes humanitarian aid, 
reconstruction, and capacity-building in conflict 
and disaster zones in different parts of the globe 
but mainly in Africa and the Middle East. Official 
actors have the upper hand and facilitate the work of 
civilian actors as long as they follow the state line in 
their humanitarian interventions.19 This cooperation 
aims to improve the socio-economic situation in 
these countries and provides no-strings-attached aid 
in conflict geographies. This CR role uses Turkey’s 
official and civilian assets to bridge the gap between 
conflicting sides to alleviate the suffering caused 
by disasters. Turkey’s multi-sector involvement in 
Somalia epitomizes this role, with actions ranging 
from mediation between Somali and Somaliland to 
humanitarian and development aid and construction 
of the public service infrastructure in Somalia.
Turkey’s third CR role is military engagement. Turkey 
has deployed peacekeeping forces under the UN and 
NATO mandate to conflict zones like Bosnia, Lebanon, 
Kosovo, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Turkey has a 
successful record of peacekeeping missions abroad. 
For example, Turkey commanded NATO missions in 
Afghanistan several times. Turkey has also provided 
military trainings as a contribution to the post-
conflict resolution process in an increasing number 
of countries and has established military bases on 
bilateral security agreements like in Qatar and Somalia. 
In the most extreme cases, the last tenant of this CR 
role is military intervention in order to directly engage 
with conflict situations. This has been the case in the 
Turkish military incursion into Syria and continuous 
operations in Northern Iraq.
19 Interview with a bureaucrat from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 
Pınar Akpınar in correspondence with the author, Ankara, November 23, 
2017. 
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The validity of conflict management depends on 
implementing immediate or time-sensitive measures 
toward a temporary or lasting solution. As discussed 
in the previous section, the Turkish state’s CR roles 
emanate from its capabilities, use of power, and strategic 
environment. However, there are a number of problems 
in delivering the desired results vis-à-vis conflicts.
First, the Turkish state’s resistance to understanding 
both sides of societal conflicts is the main reason 
behind the confusion vis-à-vis recent urban riots. Urban 
demonstrations are seen as a secondary challenge on 
the state’s CR agenda, which often criminalizes, others, 
and oppresses protestors. For example, the protest of a 
small environmental group defending the preservation 
of Gezi Park, a small green area in central Istanbul, 
after rumors that a shopping mall would be built upon it 
escalated to widespread riots in major cities in Turkey 
escalated into a show of the state’s use of coercive 
measures against the protesters. The spillover of the 
riots across the country, escalation of violence, and 
deepening polarization were altogether a non-issue 
in the eyes of policymakers. Interestingly, the rising 
violence on the side of protesters was used to construct 
a narrative that enemies of the state were joining their 
forces to overthrow the Turkish government, and this 
narrative had been utilized to justify measures against 
the protesters. This behavior was similarly witnessed 
during the protests after a deadly explosion in a coalmine 
in the town of Soma. The worst mining disaster in 
Turkish history resulted in anger and grief from people 
in Soma and nationwide. The protests resulted in state-
sanctioned attacks against the protestors, the same 
response as exemplified in other cases where the thin 
line between co-optation and coercion by the Turkish 
state were used as means of conflict resolution. 
The second problem brought on by Turkey’s CR role 
is the absence of a peace plan under the umbrella of 
the state apparatus. The violence-prone and often 
militarized CR methods of the Turkish state dominate 
the field of conflict resolution, from urban riots to 
ethnic insurgencies. The state’s lack of comprehensive 
and multifaceted CR roles, to a certain degree, bear 
responsibility for missed opportunities to pursue 
a reconciliatory track. This can be seen in the brief 
period of negotiation between the state and the PKK 
ending in summer 2015. This so-called peace process 
found political and social support across the board as 
many hoped that this process would make the Kurdish 
problem a matter of the past. Yet, coming to terms with 
the process was dubious from the beginning. For one, the 
state elites refrained from calling negotiations with the 
Kurdish groups a peace process and instead preferred 
to refer to the process as a “solution process.” Some 
would say that the state lacked concrete plans for peace 
from the very beginning. On the other side, while the 
hardliners prevailed among the Kurdish groups in favor 
of expansion in Syria and terror attacks in Turkey, there 
was discernible resistance from the state establishment 
and nationalist groups to tolerate the idea of a possible 
auxiliary role for both the eminent persons and the 
Kurdish negotiators. 
The narrative of how the negotiations ended is another 
source of conflict. According to Sağlar, the ruling AK 
Party exploited its governing position to manipulate the 
political agenda of transition to elevate its party leader 
to a strong presidential position. Sağlar argues that the 
state elites lacked a conclusive peace plan, specifically 
about the Kurdish issue, and the limited number of 
peace attempts only served particularistic political 
agendas in Turkey.20 Mesut Yeğen, a scholar at Istanbul 
Şehir University, opposes this view and details the role 
of mismanagement by the parties, i.e., the AK Party and 
the PKK, which led to the eventual failure in concluding 
the peace process.21 The strong belief in the need to have 
the upper hand with an aura of superiority vis-à-vis 
peripheral demands prevented both the government 
and bureaucracy from taking nuanced steps in conflict 
management, which reinforced the negative results of 
the “peace plan.”
The deficiency of the state’s peace plan is also 
reflective of a third problem—the lack of institutions 
in the conflict management process. For example, the 
Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (Kamu 
Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı) operating under 
the Ministry of Interior was established in 2010 to 
strengthen official capacity for conflict management 
in Turkey. It has, among others, the duty of “informing 
public opinion through national and international 
works and gaining public support” for counterterrorism 
activities.22 The Undersecretariat organized the Wise 
People Commission—who were selected with the 
approval of both the state authorities and to some extent 
Kurdish groups to popularize and legitimize peace talks 
20 Interview with Sağlar.
21 Yeğen, The Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey, 13-14.
22 For more information see, Turkish Ministry of Interior Website, http://
www.kdgm.gov.tr/?ax=kdgmalangsmainpage&l=en.
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across the broader public—to work all around Turkey in 
the later months of 2013 and first half of 2014. After the 
impasse and eventual eruption of violence in Kurdish-
majority areas, this institution was sidelined and has 
not played any conflict management role to date. The 
second example is that of the General Directorate 
for Conflict Management and Mediation, which was 
created by Law 6004 on the Organization and Duties 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010. Despite 
the critical role of CR in Turkish foreign policy and a 
number of mediation initiatives abroad, this general 
directorate of the ministry has not been operational, 
and the related issues are still being handled by the 
policy-planning unit. The lack of institutionalization 
appears to be a direct result of the state’s preference 
to treat conflict management as an overwhelming 
security issue and strong belief in state’s supremacy 
within the domestic realm. The choices of co-optation 
and coercion do not require nuanced and institutional 
involvement. In fact, the state would consider such 
involvement as a challenge and barrier to the conflict 
situation. In foreign policy, with growing need for alter-
native and specialized processes in CR, the absence of 
institutions in policy making is a reflection of the lack of 
capacity and expertise on the issues of conflict resolu-
tion and mediation.
As a fourth problem, the Turkish parliament has 
not played a prominent role in conflict resolution in 
Turkey. Aside from political representation issues due 
to political party law and electoral thresholds, among 
other reasons, the major weakness of the parliament 
is a long-standing characteristic of Turkish political 
culture. In general, the parliament cannot reach accom-
modation and consensus even on issues of utmost 
importance. The Turkish parliament has the potential 
to create institutional mechanisms to widen the scope 
and function of state CR mechanisms. Yet the absence of 
political will, short-term political agendas, contentious 
political culture, and state elite’s dominant attitudes, 
inter alia, prevent it from playing up to that role. There 
is a tendency among politicians from different sides of 
the political spectrum to identify their positions in line 
with the state apparatus’s approach. Therefore, the state 
elites have had no problem in finding allies in the parlia-
ment in their endeavor to pursue a national security 
first approach in politics. For example, the parliament 
established a steering committee on peace process in 
2013, the Resolution Process Assessment  Commis-
sion, in order to analyze the ongoing Kurdish process 
and alternatives for different groups’ increased 
political participation in this process. The Commission 
consisted of 11 members from the AK Party and HDP. 
Two other parties, CHP and Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP), in the parliament refused to participate in the 
commission on the grounds that it espoused a separatist 
agenda and thus stood against national (state) interests. 
The short-term work of the Committee ended up with a 
comprehensive and progressive report on the analysis 
of the Kurdish problem and suggested new perspectives 
for resolution.23 The suggestions provided insights for 
change and adoption of new bills to prepare the legal 
framework for addressing the Kurdish problem in 2014. 
Despite these radical moves, relative to the mainstream 
CR attitudes in Turkey, the parliamentary process did 
not provide substantial input to the peace process. 
Last but not least among the major problems before 
the state’s CR efforts is the eroding constitutional 
order in Turkey and difficulty in identifying a unifying 
ethos for political and social stability. Polarization has 
become the rule of thumb in Turkish politics. Politi-
cians instrumentalized the failing social contract in 
order to polarize different segments of society and 
consolidate their electoral constituency. Although 
social groups largely managed to avoid conflict over 
differences among each other, political and state elites 
do not hesitate to magnify and deepen polarization as 
a means of hegemony and control over the state system 
and, reflexively, the society as a whole. This motive 
was largely the case behind the Gülenist attempts for 
takeover of the state institutions, which ended in the 
July 15 coup attempt that eventually brought the state 
to the point of collapse. The Gülenist understanding of 
politics has been a product of this polarization, which 
defied all definitions of rule of law and pluralist democ-
racy. The terrorizing zero-sum logic in the end not only 
undermined the state institutions but also cultivated 
further mistrust among different segments of society. 
The poisonous political atmosphere has unwound all 
elements of the constitutional system in Turkey and 
urgently entails a broad based reconciliation in order 
for the Turkish state to weather the growing instability. 
Haldun Solmaztürk, Director of 21st Century Turkey 
Institute and a retired Brigadier General, points out 
the restraining impact of political polarization and 
resultant all-or-nothing tendencies in Turkish poli-
tics. He thus argues that there is no feasible room for 
constructive attempts for CR under the current political 
atmosphere.24 
23 For the full text of the report see, TBMM, Toplumsal Barış Yollarının 
Araştırılması ve Çözüm Sürecinin Değerlendirilmesi Amacıyla Kurulan 
Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu, Ankara, Kasım 2013,  http://tbmm.
gov.tr/komisyon/cozum_sureci/docs/cozum_kom_raporu.pdf.
24 Interview with Haldun Solmaztürk by Pınar Akpınar, Director of 21st 
Century Turkey Institute, in correspondence with the author, Ankara, 
November 23, 2017.
12
T H E  R O L E  O F  T H E  T U R K I S H  S T A T E  I N  C O N F L I C T  R E S O L U T I O N
C O N C LUS I O N
The Turkish state’s binary CR approach of main-
taining negative peace has fallen short of resolving 
complex political and social conflicts in Turkey. 
This paper made a preliminary attempt to depict the 
state’s approach and exemplified general and specific 
conflicts to demonstrate the state’s ingrained prefer-
ence for either co-optation or coercion. This paper puts 
forth that this traditional approach, which considers 
state and society as exclusive interlocutors and builds 
on the belief that “state interests trump all others,” has 
failed to comprehend that modern and post-modern 
conflicts are played and resolved before a wider audi-
ence of multiple domestic actors and international 
community with different stakes and priorities. With 
multiple actors involved the vectors of the conflict are 
not unidirectional, and even settlements entail multi-
dimensional formulas.
As a result, the need for change in the state’s CR role is 
paramount and in many ways essential for the Turkish 
polity to perpetuate its ability to provide basic public 
goods such as security and stability. The currently 
held approach harms Turkish interests and deprives 
Turkey of the ability to solve its deep-rooted social 
problems. An alternative approach could, first, change 
the framing of conflicts away from the “us vs. them” 
dichotomy; second, engage multiple actors interested 
in the conflict; third, seek out professional assistance 
from academia and experts; and last but not least, begin 
the process of developing institutional capacity in CR. 
To that end, it would be a wise approach for policy 
makers to work toward the consolidation of democracy 
and rule of law in order to set the stage for a more 
comprehensive, politically and culturally oriented 
approach to state-led CR efforts in Turkey.
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